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Introduction
In each multi-person organization, tasks have to be divided between the organization's members. Speci…cally, the manager of the organization (henceforth called the principal) has to decide about which tasks to handle himself and which tasks to delegate to his subordinates (henceforth called the agents).
In other words, the principal has to install an appropriate job design (i.e. a grouping of tasks into jobs). This decision is essential for the organization's success in the market. A …rm with an ine¢ cient internal organization is likely to produce at higher costs than its better organized competitors and so faces an important comparative disadvantage. 1 Besides the obvious reason that a principal is usually time-constrained and thus cannot handle all tasks himself, the economic literature gives two main reasons for delegation of a task. The …rst reason is based on the assumption that an agent is more appropriate for a certain task, either because 1 In order to see, what consequences an ine¢ cient internal organization might have, consider the Deutsche Telekom AG, Germany's biggest telecommunications company. Until 2004, the company was subdivided into four divisions, T-Online (responsible for Internet services), T-Mobile (mobile telecommunications services), T-Systems (Information Technology), and T-Com (…xed network). This structure proved to be very problematic. The single divisions acted in an uncoordinated way and partly spent resources to alienate customers from each other. Telekom's CEO Kai-Uwe Ricke …nally realized that Telekom was ine¢ ciently organized and restructured the company. Presently, it consists of three divisions, one responsible for business customers, the second covering the market for mobile telecommunications services, and the third dealing with broadband and …xed network services.
he is in possession of relevant information that cannot be easily transferred or because he has important abilities the principal has not. The second reason builds on incentive considerations. Aghion & Tirole (1997) e.g. argue that delegation of formal responsibility leads to increased initiative at lower layers of a hierarchy. If formal responsibility is delegated to an agent, the principal commits not to overrule the agent, yielding higher incentives for the agent. On the other hand, delegation of a task and hence of responsibility may also entail incentive problems, as the agent is likely to pursue di¤erent goals than the …rm. These incentive problems might outbalance the bene…ts from delegation. Concentrating on delegation as a means to ensure an e¢ -cient use of decentralized information, Melumad & Reichelstein (1987) and Melumad et al. (1995 Melumad et al. ( , 1997 extensively deal with these incentive problems.
Making use of di¤erent revelation mechanisms, they demonstrate under what circumstances the problems may or may not be eliminated.
Further, in a model, where only aggregate output on several tasks is measurable, Itoh (1994 Itoh ( , 2001 analyzes di¤erent modes of delegation. Assuming that the principal is exogenously forced to delegate at least one task, Itoh found that three e¤ects mainly in ‡uenced the optimal allocation of tasks.
With risk-averse agents, the principal seeks to do some task himself or to assign all tasks to a single agent in order to save on risk premiums. However, assigning all tasks to a single agent might lead to an overload of that agent and, hence, to high e¤ort costs the agent must be compensated for. Finally, if the principal decides to handle some task himself, there will arise some kind of free-rider problem that cannot be eliminated by means of incentive pay.
While Itoh mentioned important aspects of the job design decision, his analysis is incomplete in that the principal solely relies on formal incentive contracts to motivate the agents. In many …rms, however, incentives are not solely provided via formal contracts, but also via long-lasting relational agreements.
2 Employees are often paid contingent on contractible measures (such as sales volume), but also on subjective assessments that are not veri…- This question is tried to be answered in the current paper. I therefore combine the model of Itoh (1994) with a model of Baker et al. (1994) . Baker et al. consider a principal-agent relationship, where the principal remunerates the agent contingent on both, the realizations of contractible and noncontractible performance measures. The authors particularly focus on the interaction of these forms of compensation. 4 This paper applies the Baker 2 Relational contracts are also referred to as informal, implicit or self-enforcing contracts.
Throughout the paper, I use relational contracts and informal contracts as synonyms. 3 For further examples see Gibbons (2005) , who reports on several other …rms tying their employees'compensations to subjective performance measures. 4 Other papers analyzing the interaction of formal and relational contracts include et al. model to situations, in which two tasks have to be dealt with and the principal is not able to handle all the tasks himself.
Two kinds of job design, partial delegation (one task is handled by the principal and one task by an agent) and complete delegation with specialization (each task is dealt with by a di¤erent agent), are compared in the absence as well as in the presence of relational agreements. 5 Formal contracts are based on an imperfect measure of joint contribution to …rm value on the two tasks. In the absence of relational contracts, the job design decision is then determined by a trade-o¤ of two countervailing e¤ects. Due to the imperfection of the measure, the agents'e¤orts are usually distorted with respect to desired e¤ort. This e¤ect is more distinctive under complete delegation with specialization, since, in this case, two agents instead of one are involved in the production process. On the other hand, as compensation is based on a measure of joint performance, a free-rider problem is present.
While this problem can be e¤ectively mitigated under complete delegation with specialization by means of incentive pay, under partial delegation, it cannot. Assuming that the performance measure is positively correlated to total contribution to …rm value, providing the agent with higher incentives automatically yields lower incentives for the principal (and vice versa). Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995) , Pearce and Stacchetti (1998) , Che and Yoo (2001), Poppo and Zenger (2002) , Rayo (2002) , or Itoh and Morita (2004) . 5 Itoh considered a third job design, namely complete delegation without specialization, where a single agent handles both tasks. However, in this paper this job design is always dominated by complete delegation with specialization. The reason is that Itoh considered risk-averse agents, whereas the current paper deals with risk-neutral ones.
Considering both e¤ects, a simple, intuitive condition is derived: Partial delegation will be optimal, if and only if the distortion in an agent's e¤ort is relatively high. That is, in her paper, the decision to delegate all tasks is exogenously given, and then the best form of complete delegation is derived.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the optimal job design in the absence of relational agreements, while section 3 extends the analysis to a combined use of formal and relational contracts. Section 4 contains a discussion of several model assumptions and section 5 concludes.
2 Job design in the absence of relational contracts As mentioned before, the current model combines the models of Itoh (1994) and Baker et al. (1994) . Consider a principal and two identical agents, all assumed to be risk-neutral. In the organization, two tasks have to be dealt with, tasks a and b. Because of e.g. time restrictions the principal is able to handle at most one task, whereas an agent may handle both tasks. 6 The 6 The model also (and perhaps better) refers to a situation, where more than two tasks have to be handled, but only two tasks may be delegated by the principal. Since he has to handle all remaining tasks, the principal has to delegate at least one task.
principal can therefore decide to assign either both tasks to a single agent (complete delegation without specialization), task a to one agent and task b to another (complete delegation with specialization), or to delegate one task and handle the remaining task himself (partial delegation). 7 With riskneutral agents and tasks being substitutes, it can be shown that complete delegation without specialization is always dominated by complete delegation with specialization. 8 The paper therefore focuses on a comparison of complete delegation with specialization (henceforth CDS) and partial delegation (henceforth PD).
The person in charge of task i = a; b exerts unobservable e¤ort e i 0 that stochastically determines an observable, but unveri…able output y i .
9
This output measures contribution to …rm value on task i and equals either one or zero. Let the probability that output equals one be given by
Pr ob fy i = 1je i g = min fe i ; 1g. Total output is given by y = y a + y b .
7 It is implicitly assumed that task sharing is impossible. One reason for this assumption could be that each task requires the use of a machine that cannot be operated by two people at the same time. 8 The proof of this statement is available from the author upon request. 9 As pointed out by Malcomson (1984) , a rank-order tournament between the agents could be arranged, even if output is unveri…able by a third party. With the assumptions made in this paper (in particular, risk neutrality and unlimited liability of the agents) such a tournament would always yield a …rst-best solution, in the static as well as in the dynamic case. However, a tournament scheme may also lead to serious problems such as collusion between the agents (see e.g. Dye (1984) ) or sabotage (see e.g. Lazear (1989) , Konrad (2000) or Chen (2003)). Throughout the paper it is assumed that these problems are so severe that the tournament scheme is never desired.
E¤orts e a and e b additionally a¤ect a second performance measure p that is contractible and therefore may be the basis of an enforceable contract. p is an imperfect measure of joint contribution to …rm value on the two tasks and also equals either one or zero. The probability of a measure realization of one is given by Pr ob fp = 1je a ; e b g = min f a e a + b e b ; 1g. The realization of each parameter i is unknown, when the principal determines the job design and when the agents are o¤ered a wage contract. Thereafter, it is revealed to the respective person in charge, that is, the person in charge for task a and days, where small e¤ort increases p but not y ( i much larger than one).
It is further assumed that the mean of i equals one so that, in expectation, the measure p is an unbiased measure of total output y. This assumption allows to characterize the expected di¤erence of p from y by a single measure, namely the variance V ar
Their distribution is common knowledge.
E¤ort entails costs, which, to derive several closed-form solutions, are assumed to be quadratic and given by C (e i ) = 
p and w
p, where 10 This is the case under complete delegation without specialization in Itoh (1994) . Under that job design, costs, entailed by e¤ort on a task, are likely to increase in the e¤ort level on the other task. It is this cost substitutability between the tasks that causes the inexpediency of complete delegation without specialization.
the f should indicate the isolated consideration of formal contracts. While the agents always receive a …xed wage of oi , they will receive the variable component 1i ; only if the joint performance measure p equals one.
The model is solved by backward induction. I start with the CDS case.
After observing the realization of a , the agent working on task a chooses his e¤ort to maximize expected utility. This expected utility is given by (1).
It consists of the expected wage payment minus costs, entailed by e¤ort.
(1) 
In equations (2) and (3) as well as in the following, notation is simpli…ed 
Maximizing (4) yields the solution
and
Using the i.i.d. assumption, the solution becomes
. The principal's expected pro…t is given by
The optimal formal contract under PD can be derived analogously. Suppose in this case, without loss of generality, that the principal delegates the second task and handles the …rst task himself. The principal's and the agent's optimal e¤ort are then e a = . The optimal incentive parameter satis…es
, or with the i.i.d. assumption,
. The principal achieves an expected pro…t of
.
A comparison of E CDS;f and E P D;f immediately yields the following proposition:
Proposition 1 product, whereas they bear the complete e¤ort costs. As a consequence, they decide to choose ine¢ ciently low e¤orts. This free-rider problem can be mitigated e¤ectively under CDS by installing high-powered incentives, i.e., by increasing both variable components. Under PD, on the other hand, providing the principal and the agent with high-powered incentives is impossible.
The joint performance measure is positively correlated to total output. Thus, if the principal provides the agent with high incentives, he will automatically decrease his marginal payo¤ from exerting e¤ort. That is, installing high incentives for the agent leads to low incentives for the principal and vice versa. 11 As a consequence, under PD the free-rider problem is still present.
However, as seen in proposition 1, PD may also be the preferred choice of job design. There exists a second negative e¤ect that is less severe under PD than under CDS. As mentioned before, the measure p is only an imperfect measure of total contribution to …rm value. Due to this imperfection, an agent's behavior shows distortions with respect to desired behavior. This distortion depends on the realization of i . For i < 1, the agent responsible for task i exerts undesirably low e¤ort. On the contrary, for i > 1, the actual e¤ort is undesirably high. Since the principal must compensate the agents for their e¤ort costs such distortions from desired e¤ort are costly. Under PD, this distorting behavior is clearly less serious. There is only one agent behaving ine¢ ciently. The principal focuses on the realization of output and 11 As shown by Holmström (1982) , the free-rider problem might be solved by introducing a third party being able to "break the budget". Since such a solution entails new complications (see e.g. Eswaran and Kotwal (1984) ) it is not considered in this paper.
therefore chooses a more desired e¤ort.
The cut-o¤ in proposition 1 is a result of the interaction of these two e¤ects. As is clear from the preceding argumentation, PD will be preferable, if the distortion in an agent's e¤ort with respect to the desired e¤ort is very high. Since, in expectation, p is an unbiased measure of y, the agents'e¤orts will be highly distorted if V ar [ ] is high. This variance can be rewritten as 3 Job design when formal and relational contracts interact
In the one-period model in section 2, no relational agreement could be sustained, since every such agreement would be reneged on. In order to analyze the interaction of formal and relational contracts, I therefore consider an in…nitely repeated version of the model from section 2.
In this in…nite horizon model, some additional assumptions have to be introduced. First, it is assumed that the principal, besides the wage payment speci…ed in section 2, o¤ers an agent a bonus payment contingent on the agent's contribution to …rm value. As in Baker et al. (1994) , to avoid complications by creating a temptation for the agents to break the implicit contract, the relational bonus is assumed to be non-negative. This assumption should be ful…lled in most real world settings.
The principal discounts future pro…ts. The discount rate is r, i.e., a oneunit pro…t in the next period is worth 1 1+r units in the present one. The discount rate r could, for example, represent the interest rate, to which the principal could lend or borrow money. The agents are assumed to discount future utility at a rate r a , which may or may not di¤er from r. The purpose of this discount rate is simply to appropriately de…ne the in…nitely repeated game. It does not a¤ect the model results, as the following argumentation will show. In the model, discounting solely a¤ects a party's temptation to renege on a relational contract. However, as discussed before, an agent is not interested in refusing the payment of a relational bonus, since the bonus accrues to him. Moreover, he could breach the relational contract by deviating from the agreed e¤ort. As this e¤ort is expected utility maximizing, such a deviation is also not desirable for the agent.
All players, i.e., the principal and the agents, are assumed to follow a modi…ed grim trigger strategy. Roughly speaking, they start by cooperating (that is, by honoring the relational agreement) and continue cooperation unless one player defects, in which case they refuse to cooperate forever after. Referred to the model this means that, after the informal agreement was reneged on once, no player will ever honor some informal contract and the parties will rely on the formal contracts derived in section 2.
12 Moreover, un-12 Two remarks are necessary: First, in the literature on in…nite games, it is sometimes argued that the game remaining after one party defects coincides with the game as a whole.
As a consequence, equilibria being available in the game as a whole should also be available after the relational agreement was broken. Hence, the parties should be able to renegotiate from punishment to a di¤erent equilibrium with higher payo¤s. I abstract from this der CDS, these strategies imply that if the principal reneges on the relational bonus of only one agent, both agents lose trust in the principal.
Finally, suppose that the change from a certain job design to another entails considerable …x costs, so that the principal always maintains the job design he initially has chosen. This assumption has implications for payments o¤ the equilibrium path. It ensures that, in case the principal reneges on the relational contract, that is, when relational contracts are no longer available, he does not change the job design. Although mainly made to simplify calculations, this assumption seems to map practice very well, for …rms seem to change their organizational structure very rarely. The assumption is cancelled in section 4.
In order to derive the optimal combination of formal and relational contracts, I search for a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. I consider only stationary contracts, under which the principal in every period o¤ers the same wage contract and the agents choose the same e¤orts on the equilibrium path. This is, as shown by Levin (2003) , without loss of generality.
possibility by assuming that renegotiation costs are too high, either because renegotiation causes too high monetary costs or because it simply takes too long. In the latter case, renegotiation would prevent the parties from working on their tasks so that renegotiation gains would be outweighed by the loss in production. Second, Abreu (1988) showed that highest equilibrium payo¤s are supported by the strongest credible punishments. However, in the current model, grim trigger strategies may not yield strongest credible punishment (i.e. the grim trigger strategies may not form an optimal penal code). Again, it could be argued that the elaboration of an optimal penal code would be too costly so that relying on the (relatively simple) grim trigger strategies is preferred.
The wage payment to the agent dealing with task i is in each period given by where r indicates the combined use of formal and relational contracts. The term i y i corresponds to an informal promise of the principal to pay the agent a bonus depending on the realization of unveri…able output. 13 Since such an informal promise cannot be enforced by a court, it must be self-enforcing.
Consider …rst the CDS case. The incentives provided by a relational contract depend on whether or not the agents believe that the principal will honor the contract. If, in a given period, they trust the principal, the agents will choose their e¤orts, after observing i , to maximize expected ex post utilities given by (5) and (6) 
It can easily be seen that this constraint is more likely to be satis…ed, the higher the additional pro…t from relying on relational agreements, the lower the discount rate r, and the lower the relational bonus to be paid. This is intuitive. If the principal does gain very much from the use of relational contracts and if he is rather patient (that is, future pro…ts are hardly discounted), the bene…t from not paying the relational bonuses will probably be outweighed by the loss in future pro…ts. On the other hand, the gain from not paying the bonus and, hence, the reneging temptation certainly increases in the size of the bonuses.
Consider now the optimal choice of the incentive parameters. While deter- 
These conditions lead to a symmetric solution, the principal chooses same wage contracts for the two agents, i.e. 
If, in the optimum, the non-reneging constraint is non-binding (i.e. = 0), the solution is CDS;r 1 = 0 and CDS;r = 1. That is, if the principal is su¢ ciently patient, a …rst-best relational contract will be installed. Each agent bases his e¤ort decision solely on the realization of output and, as a consequence, no distorting behavior will arise.
Of more interest is the case, in which the principal is less patient so that the non-reneging constraint binds in the optimum. From (16) and the binding condition (10), the second-best relational bonus and the second-best expected pro…t can be derived. The possible values of relational bonus and expected pro…t are given by (18) and (19), respectively:
; f or r r c (19)
The derivation of the optimal combination of formal and relational contract in the PD case is analogous. The optimal relational bonus in this case Note …rst that r >r p corresponds to the case, where the principal is so impatient or the interest rate is so high that any informal contract would be reneged on. Put di¤erently, in this case only formal contracts are available.
As should be clear, the model analyzed in section 2 is only a special case of the interaction of formal and relational contracts. Of great interest is the result that the optimal job design if only formal contracts are available need no longer be optimal when the principal uses some combination of formal and relational contract to compensate his agents. On the contrary, when formal and relational contracts interact, this job design is often the less preferred one. In other words, the results derived in the less general model in section 2 are not robust to an introduction of relational agreements.
Let me explain this result in more detail. The principal would always prefer to rely on informal contracts rather than on formal contracts, since, in this way, distortions in the agents' e¤orts are mitigated. However, as condition (10) indicates, the principal may be unable to commit not to renege on relational bonuses so high that the …rst-best solution would be achieved.
He therefore uses some combination of formal and relational contracts as incentive device. The appropriateness of a job design in this case roughly depends on three factors. First, it depends on the job designs' needs for relational agreements, i.e., the relative pro…t increase under each job design when formal incentives are replaced by relational ones. Let us now analyze, under which job design higher relational bonuses can be sustained. The possibility to remunerate an agent with a certain relational bonus depends on the level of the bonus, the number of bonuses to be paid, the di¤erence in pro…t in the presence and absence of relational contracts, and the discount rate. Hence, the comparison of the two job designs with respect to the maximum relational bonus they may implement depends on the respective di¤erence in pro…ts when relational contracts are honored and when they are not as well as on the number of bonuses to be paid. Recall
This should lead to the implementation of higher relational bonuses under PD, since, under that job design, the principal is more heavily punished for reneging on the relational contract.
Moreover, under PD, a higher relational bonus should be sustained since this bonus has to be paid only for one agent and not for two as under CDS.
On account of this, the principal's bene…t from reneging on the relational contract should be lower under PD.
Since these e¤ects are enforcing, PD should always lead to higher relational bonuses than CDS. This can be con…rmed comparing (18) and (20).
Not only is the second-best relational bonus higher, but there are also pa- As a consequence, PD allows a much wider use of relational contracts than CDS. It is therefore preferred for many values of the discount parameter r.
Since CDS is optimal in the absence of relational agreements, there exists a clear cut-o¤ r, where the optimal job design changes. For r < r, the principal under PD makes extensive use of informal agreements, whereas formal contracts are of major importance under CDS. Hence, for r < r, PD is optimal. For r > r, under both job designs relational agreements are rather unimportant. In this case, CDS is preferred since it is very e¤ective in mitigating the free-rider problem and su¤ers only little from distortion in e¤orts.
It is worth emphasizing the relation between a job design's appropriateness under formal contracts and its suitability under a combined use of formal and relational contracts. This relation is namely very helpful in explaining the arising discrepancy between the optimal job design in the absence and presence of relational agreements. Loosely speaking, a job design performing poorly in the absence of relational contracts is likely to do (relatively) better in their presence. Let me explain this in more detail. A job design performing poorly in the absence of relational agreements may sustain a relatively high relational bonus, as the principal's punishment in case of reneging on the relational contract is relatively high. The principal is therefore less tempted to renege on the relational agreement. Similarly, as mentioned before, a poorly performing job design bene…ts relatively more from the introduction of re- Proof: Obvious and omitted.
Discussion
Up to this point, two assumptions were made facilitating the analysis, namely that a change in organizational structure entails considerable …xed costs and that the agents'reservation utilities equal zero. I now relax these assumptions. Since the model becomes extremely complicated once the assumptions are cancelled, I only discuss the e¤ects that such a cancellation entails. I begin with the assumption concerning the …xed costs.
If a change in job design is totally costless, the principal will, after reneging on the relational contract, always switch to that job design being optimal in the absence of relational agreements. Hence, for
he will choose PD (CDS). This may lead to a higher pro…t o¤ the equilibrium path. To be concrete, for E [ 2 ] > 1:5(E [ 2 ] < 1:5), the principal's CDS (PD) pro…t in the absence of relational contracts increases, whereas the PD (CDS) pro…t does not change. This change in pro…t has impacts on the non-reneging constraint. A ceteris paribus increase in pro…t, when the principal solely relies on formal contracts, yields a (weakly) lower relational bonus that can be sustained. Hence, compared to the results in proposition 2, CDS should become more preferable since the relational bonus being sustained under PD decreases. Similarly, compared to the results in proposition 3, PD should become even more dominant.
Although it is with some related implications, the introduction of a reservation utility di¤erent from zero entails more complex e¤ects. First, PD should always become more preferable, since, under PD, only one agent has to be compensated for U . In order to determine the implications on the relational bonus to be sustained and the pro…ts under relational agreements, it is convenient to make some case distinction. In the …rst case, the reservation utility is rather small. In particular, it is so small that, under both job designs, the pro…t that can be realized in the absence of relational contracts remains positive. In this case, the model results with respect to the relational bonus do not change at all. With positive reservation utilities both, the pro…t, when formal and relational contracts interact as well as the pro…t when the principal solely relies on formal contracts, are decreased by the same amount. The bonus that can be sustained therefore does not change. In the second case, the reservation utilities adopt intermediate values so that, in the absence of relational agreements, one job design leads to a positive pro…t and the other one to zero pro…t. 14 An increase in reservation utility then a¤ects only three and not four pro…ts. While it decreases all positive pro…ts, the zero pro…t is una¤ected. As a consequence, the bonus under the job design, where both pro…ts are positive does not change. On the contrary, the bonus under the other job design (weakly) decreases. Hence, the …rst job design should (relatively) become more desirable. In case three, the reservation util-ities are so high that both job designs lead to zero pro…ts in the absence of relational contracts. An increase in reservation utility then a¤ects both job designs, since the relational bonus (weakly) decreases under PD as well as under CDS. However, the absolute change in bonus and its impact on the pro…t may be di¤erent.
Concluding Remarks
This paper started by comparing two di¤erent job designs in a static environment. A very nice and intuitive condition was derived indicating when each job design is optimal, respectively. Thereafter, a model with in…nite horizon was considered. The purpose was to allow the principal to use both, formal and informal contracts, as incentive device. It was shown that the introduction of relational contracts has a crucial impact on a job design's appropriateness. Particularly, a job design being optimal in the absence of relational contracts need no longer be optimal, if these contracts are available.
The reason is that a job design performing very poorly in the absence of relational agreements allows the principal to install high-powered informal incentives, since his punishment from defecting is very high. Moreover, the principal bene…ts from the introduction of relational contracts more strongly in settings, where relying solely on formal contracts is not very pro…table.
The interplay of these two e¤ects may overturn the results derived in the absence of relational agreements.
This observation is particularly very interesting, since most economic models are static ones. As seen in this paper, the results derived in sta- 
